We calibrate a sequence of four nested models to study the dynamics of wealth accumulation.
Introduction
We simulate the dynamics of wealth accumulation in a model calibrated to the US economy, with initial conditions taken from 2012 data. Although the model is inspired by Piketty (2014) , we have added quasi-traditional micro-foundations: at each date there is an equilibrium where the return to capital and the real wage balance the markets for capital and labor. The equilibrium is only 'quasi'-traditional for the following reason. Agents do not maximize a discounted infinite sum of consumption over time, or even of consumption over time and a bequest, but rather a single-period utility function of consumption and savings, repeated in each period. That is, agents desire to consume and to accumulate wealth for its own sake. This assumption is inspired by Marx, who argued that, while pre-capitalist economies produced commodities, exchanging them for money in order to purchase a different commodity bundle ( C − M − ′ C , à la Marx) , capitalist property relations produce agents whose aim is to transform money into more money, via the intermediary of commodities (labor power and capital), thus M − C − ′ M . Piketty (2014) argueseffectively, we believe -that the life cycle model, which is the C − M − ′ C formulation -is not supported by the data. Moreover, our belief is that the very wealthy do not accumulate in order to leave bequests. They do so because 'money is life's report card,' as the caption of a New Yorker cartoon said. Warren Buffet (Andrew Carnegie) does not (did not) accumulate wealth in order to enrich his children; nor were his motives primarily philanthropic, although Buffet will (Carnegie did) use his winnings in the capitalist game for philanthropic ends.
Accumulation for its own sake is the motivation for most members of the wealthy class, for success in the game of life is judged by one's wealth, often signaled by one's consumption.
We begin by postulating a distribution of wealth given by the 2012 US wealth distribution, from Piketty and Zucman (2013) . We postulate a lognormal distribution of skills.
We assume that the distribution of wealth is monotone increasing in an individual's skill. A firm, using a CES production function whose inputs are efficiency units of labor and capital, maximizes profits. Consumer-workers offer inelastically their entire endowment of skilled labor to the firm; they demand the consumption good and supply capital to the firm in order to maximize preferences described above. The interest rate and real wage equilibrate the markets for labor and capital. There are proportional taxes on capital and labor income, the revenues from which are returned as a demogrant to each worker. In the basic model these tax rates are the same, and an equilibrium is re-established at each period. The main fundamental changing over time is the distribution of capital/wealth; there is also an exogenously growing distribution of skills, and of the 'expected' standard of living.
We introduce sequentially three more models. In Model 2, we append to the basic model lobbying by the wealthy, who contribute to a fund that is spent to convince legislators to reduce the tax rate on capital income. We describe below how the wealthy overcome the free rider problem to generate a significant lobbying fund. Consequently, the tax rate on capital income now declines, while the tax rate on labor income is exogenous and fixed.
We next amend Model 2 by introducing differential rates of return to capital: those with large amounts of capital can attain a higher rate of return than those with small amounts. This is, again, an important fact discussed by Piketty (2014) . In Model 3, this amendment accounts for a more dramatic concentration of capital than occurred in the first two models.
Finally, in Model 4, we add to Model 3 intergenerational mobility. We take a generation to last for 50 (or 25) years, and model this by assuming each individual has a probability of 2% (or 4%) of dying each year, upon which his capital passes down, without taxation, to his single offspring. The offspring's skill level -and hence her labor earningsare not inherited, but are taken to be determined by the income intergenerational mobility matrix of Chetty et al (2014) . The population dynamics are made explicit below. The dynamics of wealth again change. We present the simplest model (Model 1) in section 2, with sections 3 to 5 devoted to Models 2 to 4. In each section, we first develop analytically the model, calibrate it and then provide and comment on results from numerical simulations. Section 6 concludes.
Model 1: Basic
We start by describing analytically the basic model developed, before calibrating it and presenting our numerical results.
A. Analytical description of the model i. Endowments
There is a distribution of skill, s, denoted by a distribution function F on [0,∞) where ( ) s sdF s = ∫ denotes the average skill. There is a distribution of wealth at date 0 given by a function S 0 (s) . It is postulated that wealth/capital is monotone increasing in s.
We assume that skills increase (exogenously) by a factor of (1 + g) per annum.
ii. Production
There is a single good produced by a single firm, using a CES technology given by y(K, L) = A(aK (δ−1)/δ + (1− a)L (δ−1)/δ ) δ/(δ−1) , (2.1)
where y , K and L are per capita income, capital, and labor in efficiency units. The only technical change in the model is induced by the exogenous increase in labor skills. The firm faces an interest rate r and a real wage per efficiency unit of labor w, and maximizes profits.
Consequently, the demands for labor and capital by the firm at date t are determined by the first-order conditions from maximizing profits defined as y(K t , L t ) − w t L t − (r t + d)K t : where d is the annual rate of capital depreciation. Note that the firm replaces depreciated capital from income. Economic profits are zero.
iii. Preferences
Preferences are non-traditional. We assume there is a socially expected standard of living for people in this society, produced by a consumption level c 0 at date 0. This expected consumption level increases by a factor of (1 + g) per annum. We do not call this subsistence consumption -we set it at $100,000 in the simulations. It is the consumption level to which ordinary people aspire, which is generated by advertising and the media. (In the US, this level would define a successful middle-class life.) A sufficiently wealthy individual at date t chooses her consumption c and investment I to maximize a Stone-Geary utility function as follows:
where y t (s) is the income of individual s at date t. If there is no solution to program (2.3), because income is insufficient to purchase the consumption level c 0 (1+ g) t−1 , then the individual consumes out of wealth. To be precise:
In case 1, the individual consumes his income plus his wealth 1 ( ) t S s − , and those together do not suffice to generate the socially expected consumption of (2.4). In case 2, when her income does not suffice to allow socially expected consumption but her total asset position does, she consumes exactly socially acceptable consumption. In case 3, where her income alone suffices to allow socially acceptable consumption, she solves program (2.3) with α the marginal propensity to consume out of income. Thus, investment is given by:
(2.5)
The dynamics of wealth are given by:
Note that, because the firm replaces depreciated capital from its income, the investor can cash out his entire capital stock at the end of the period, and so the depreciation does not appear in equation (2.6).
(iv) Equilibrium
The market clearing equations are:
We assume an exogenously given income tax rate τ , the revenues from which are returned to citizens as a demogrant. Thus income for an agent of type s in year t is given by:
vi) Summary of equations and solving of the model
The equations summarizing the model are :
1. FOC, profit maximization w.r.t. K:
2. FOC, profit maximization w.r.t. L: 
B. Calibration of the model
We describe our calibration of preferences, the production function, and the initial distribution of capital.
(i) Preferences
One period is deemed to be one calendar year. We choose c 0 = 100 (thousands of dollars), which grows at a factor of (1 + g) each year, with g=0.01. We choose α = 0.6 , based on the fact that the propensity to consume for the wealthy is about 0.6 out of income.
(ii) Production function
We assume a CES production function given by (2.1). Piketty (2014) argues that a choice of the elasticity of substitution δ ∈(1.3,1.6) is implied by the historical distribution of capital's share in income. We choose δ = 1.5 .
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The capital income ratio / K y is 4.5 in the U.S. Depreciation is about 10% of GNP, which suggests a rate of depreciation d = 0.02.
Using (2.2), calculate that : From the production function, we have:
The distribution ( ) F s of skills is taken to be lognormal. The unit of skill has no meaning: we take the median skill level to be 0.85 and the mean s to be 1. We then have that (iii) The initial distribution of capital, S 0 (s)
The initial distribution of wealth is taken from Saez and Zucman (2014), Appendix dashed lines correspond to the 50th, 90th and 99th percentiles of the skill distribution. We see that the density is inversely U-shaped for the three groups spanned by these dashed lines: the 50-90, 90-99 and 99+. The density reaches its overall maximum for agents situated slightly above 90% in the distribution.
Insert Figure 2 around here
We postulate a distribution of skills that is lognormal. However, we know that the income distribution is well-approximated by a distribution that is lognormal for an interval of incomes up to a quite large income y * , and a Pareto distribution on the income interval y ≥ y * . We wish to see how well the distribution of income generated by our simulations tracks this kind of distribution.
Jantzen and Volpert (2012) characterize the Lorenz curve of a hybrid income distribution, which exhibits left-sided self-similarity (where the degree of inequality repeats itself as we restrict ourselves to poorer and poorer fractions of the population) up to a threshold income level, and right-sided self-similarity (i.e., a Pareto distribution) above that threshold. Interestingly, the equation of the Lorenz curve is of the form:
where a > −1 and b > 0 ; surprisingly, the Lorenz function has only two parameters. These authors fit the empirical income distributions of Atkinson, Piketty and Saez (2011) , choosing parameters (a,b) by least-squares, and achieve remarkably good fits. We fit our simulated income distributions using least-squares and (2.16).
The result is depicted in Figure 3 , where the equilibrium income distribution at period t=25 is shown using dots while the fitted distribution (corresponding to a=-0.28 and b=0.37 in (2.16)) is represented by a continuous blue curve. We obtain what seems to be an excellent fit, with a R square of 0.932, although our numerical computations slightly underestimate the total income shares at both the bottom and the top of the distribution, compared to the fitted distribution. The Gini coefficient corresponding to the fitted Lorenz curve is 0.386.
Insert Figure 3 around here
To better judge how well our equilibrium income distribution fits this Lorenz curve, we compare our distribution with the Lorenz curve obtained from Jantzen and Volpert (2012) without the Pareto tail. They show that this curve is of the form:
with two parameters c and p, which we choose by least-squares. Although we have two degrees of freedom when fitting our distribution to this family of Lorenz curves, as previously, we achieve a worse fit, with R2=0.9084. Figure 3 reports (in red) the best-fitted Lorenz curve without a Pareto tail. It is clear that, even though we assume a simple lognormal distribution of skills, our equilibrium income distribution after 25 periods is much closer to the hybrid distribution from Jantzen and Volpert (2012) (which they claim represents especially well the US income distribution) than to the one generated from their model without a Pareto tail.
We have also checked the robustness of our numerical results to the introduction of a Pareto tail in the skill distribution. We detail in Appendix how we have proceeded for the calibration of this hybrid skill distribution. The numerical results we obtain are very similar to the ones reported above -see Table xx in the Appendix, and compare it to Table 1 above. The figures corresponding to Figures 2 and 3 are also very similar and are omitted for the sake of brevity.
Our results are then robust to the introduction of a Pareto tail in the skill distribution. We have also fitted the new equilibrium income distribution to the Jantzen and Volpert (2012) family of Lorenz curve, and we obtain a slightly better fit, as measure by the R 2 which increases from 0.932 to 0.955. The Gini coefficient associated with this fitted Lorenz curve increases slightly, from 0.386 to 0.391.
To summarize the results obtained with Model 1, we observe that the growth rate of income and of average wealth are significantly smaller than the interest rate (g<r using Piketty's terminology). We observe a capital deepening of the economy with time, with an increase in the capital/output ratio, but a stable share of capital in total income. This deepening goes hand in hand with a more unequal distribution of wealth, with the proportion of agents with no wealth increasing from 50% to 70% after 25 years. More generally, the 90th to 99th percentile of the wealth distribution gain shares at the expense of the bottom 90 percent, with the shares of the top 1% and the top 0.1% remaining roughly constant.
We now introduce lobbying by the wealthy into the picture, and assess its impact on the equilibrium dynamics of our model.
Model 2: Lobbying
A. Analytical model Formally, the purpose of lobbying by the wealthy is to reduce the tax rate on capital income. The model will henceforth contain two tax rates, τ on labor income and τ c on capital income. If the per capita (in the whole population) expenditure on lobbying at time t
where k and β are parameters to be specified below. The effective cost of achieving a given outcome (tax rate τ c ) grows at rate g.
However, our conception of 'lobbying' is in reality much richer: it includes all those expenditures by owners of capital to protect their wealth from confiscation, which may occur not only through taxation but through other means. These expenditures include those needed to create an ideology among voters which is pro-capitalist and pro-laissez-faire, what has been called in recent years the neoliberal worldview. Thus, it includes expenditures on conservative think tanks, and on the transmission of this ideology through the media. It includes what Samuel Bowles has called 'guard labor,' labor needed to protect property from theft. Bowles and Jayadev (2014) argue that the amount of guard labor in the advanced capitalist countries is highly correlated with their Gini coefficients; they estimate that in the US in 2000, there where 200 workers employed in guard labor per 10,000 workers, the highest ratio of the advanced countries. (They include in guard labor, besides police and security guards, the military, prison officials, and weapons producers.) 'Lobbying' must also include those expenditures to prevent confiscation of profits by workers through labor organization; thus, the expenditures of the capitalist class in preventing the formation of unions, or destroying existing unions, must be included as well. Union-busting has been important in the United States during the last forty years, when the density of unionized workers has fallen from around 30% in 1960 to less than 10% today. (To see this is not simply an effect of structural changes in production, note that union density in Canada is roughly still 30% today as it was in 1960.) We would include in 'lobbying expenditures' corporate legal fees that are used to protect capital from confiscation by governments and workers, but not intra-capitalist transfers within a country, which do not change (to a first approximation) the ownership of capital by classes.
How is the budget for 'lobbying' raised in our model? The reduction in the tax rate on capital income is a public good for the wealthy, and so there is a free-rider problem in generating contributions to that budget under the usual assumptions about behavior. We solve the problem by assuming that those who contribute to lobbying optimize in the Kantian manner: the lobbying equilibrium is a multiplicative Kantian equilibrium of the game among contributors. (See Roemer (2014) for a discussion of Kantian equilibrium; see Roemer (2006) for a political model where the determination of citizen contributions to politics is modeled as a Kantian equilibrium. ) In public-good games, the multiplicative Kantian equilibrium leads to a Pareto efficient solution of the public-good problem .
Let the lobbying expenditure of an agent of type s at date t be σ t (s) . The individual's income at any contribution σ is:
The equations (3.2) define payoff functions of a game for the citizens; a multiplicative Kantian equilibrium is a function σ(⋅) such that no player would advocate that all players change their contributions by any factor (the factor being the same for the entire society). The FOC for the solution of this problem is a schedule of contributions σ(⋅) satisfying :
Expanding this expression gives:
where c ′ τ is the derivative of the function τ c (σ) implicitly defined by equation (3.1). It follows that positive contributions to lobbying are made by precisely those agents for whom 
(3.5)
We have by definition:
Integrating equation (3.4) and dividing by σ , we have:
from which we solve for σ t and τ t c = τ c (σ t ) . Finally, we solve for the function σ t (⋅) using (3.4).
A critic might well say that we should solve for the Kantian equilibrium of lobbying contributions not by having the investor maximize his income, but rather his utility. We have chosen not to do so, because when the investor maximizes income, we have a simple analytic solution for s t * (from (3.5)) and this simplifies the simulations considerably. This would not be the case were the investor to maximize her utility.
The equations summarizing the model are the same 7 equations given in subsection 2.A. (vi),
where the definition of income is now given by (3.2). We add the following four equations to these seven:
8. Lobbying contribution of a type s investor
10. Effect of lobbying on taxation of capital income
12. Definition of lowest type that contributes to lobbying: see equation (3.5) As for solving the model, we proceed as previously to obtain K t and L t , and then r t and w t . τ t c is determined by (3.10). y t (s) is determined by (3.2). Consumption, investment and saving at the end of period t are then obtained as previously, and we start the next iteration.
B. Calibration
The tax rate on labor income is maintained at τ = 0.35 , as previously. To calibrate (3.11), we choose (k,β) = (0.06, 0.40) . We do not have a justification.
The evolution of our toy economy from t=1 to t=25 is very similar in Models 1 and 2, with the same trends in all variables. We then assess the impact of lobbying on the equilibrium by comparing the last row of Tables 1 and 2. The lobbying activity results in more than halving of the capital income tax rate (from 35% in Model 1 to 15%). This results in a slightly larger GDP after 25 periods ($148,640 per capita, compared to $146,580 without lobbying) and a slightly higher capital output ratio (5.08 against 4.97 at t=25). The equilibrium interest rate is slightly lower (5.62% against 5.74%) while the equilibrium wage rate is slightly higher ($71,680 compared to $71,015). The share of capital (including depreciation) in total income increases very slightly to 38.8%.
Insert Table 2 around here At equilibrium, the top 17% of the income/wealth distribution contribute to lobbying (a proportion slightly decreasing with time) and their per capita (in the whole population) contribution increases from $1,489 at t=1 to 2 604$ at t=25, representing 1.75% of GDP.
This increase is faster than the exogenous growth rate g = 1%, resulting in an equilibrium capital income tax decreasing from 17.4% at t =1 to 15% after 25 periods.
In terms of wealth distribution, the opportunity to lobby benefits the top 10% (and especially the top 1%) at the expense of the rest of the distribution: the patrimonial middle class (50th to 90th percentile) sees its wealth share decrease to 15.6% at t=25 (compared to 16.9% without lobbying). The 90th to 99th percentile see their share increase by 0.4% thanks to lobbying (from 40.2% to 40.6%), the top 1% by 1% (from 42.8% to 43.8%) and the top 0.1% by 0.6% (from 21.8% to 22.4%). For the latter group, we now obtain that their wealth share increases with time, rather than decreasing without lobbying. Large capitals earn significantly higher rates of return than small ones. Piketty (2014) estimates these rates of return using university endowments in the United States, which must publish their rates of return. He reports that Harvard, Princeton and Yale, with endowments much larger than $1 billion, earned an average rate of return of 10.2% over the thirty year period 1980-2010. Endowments somewhat higher than $1 billion but less than those of the top three earned 8.8%, endowments between $500 million and $1 billion, 7.8%, endowments between $100 and $500 million, 7.1%, and endowments less than $100 million, 6.2%. All these numbers are much greater than capital per worker, which is
4.5)(16.8 × 10 12 ) / (155.× 10 6 ) = $490,000 . The average capital will earn much less than 6.1%, being invested by non-professionals in money-market funds, bank certificates of deposit, and mutual funds.
We model this as follows. We assume that the rate of return available for the capital owned by an agent of type s is given by:
where r t is the market-clearing interest rate and ν t is a constant to be determined below.
Thus the smallest capitals earn one-fourth the market-clearing rate, and the largest earn 1.5 times the market-clearing rate, about six times what the smallest capitals earn. The choice of functional form in (4.1) is ad hoc. It is chosen to guarantee:
• that the rates of return of r t 4 and 1.5r t are achieved at the endpoints of the interval, and
• to give a value ν t in the interval (0,5) as the solution of the equation
From (4.2), capital income in the society aggregates to the market-clearing interest rate times the stock of capital. The interval in which ν t lies according to the second bulleted property is necessary to ensure that r t (⋅) is an increasing function, which is obviously desirable 5 . As the reader will see below, the formulation of (4.1) gives the desired properties.
The equations summarizing the model are the same 11 equations given at the end of subsection 3.A., where r(t) is replaced by r t (⋅) where necessary in the equations determining income ((3.2)), individual ((3.8)) and per capita ((3.9)) lobbying contributions. We add the following two equations to these eleven:
12. Rate of return for investor of type s: see equation (4.1) 13. Consistency of rates of return with competitive rate of return: see equation (4.2) As for solving the model, we proceed as previously to obtain K t and L t , and then r t and w t .
Equations (4.1) and (4.2) determine ν t and hence r t (s) . We then proceed as explained at the end of section 3.A to solve the other variables.
B. Numerical results
Introducing To accomplish both of the bulleted properties for the function r t , it is necessary to make the function increase very rapidly for F(s) near one -hence the large exponent, 40.
Insert Table 5 around here Figure 4 depicts the interest rate as a function of the location of the individual in the wealth distribution at date t=25. The horizontal line represents the equilibrium average rate of return of 5.66%. More than 90% of the population faces a rate of return of less than 2%
(recall that more than 50% of the population has no capital income anyway), and 98.7% of the population faces a rate of return which is lower than the average. The concentration of wealth among the very top earners explains the skewness of the distribution of rates of return.
Insert Figure 4 around here This skewness has a very large impact on the equilibrium distribution of wealth. The share of the patrimonial middle class drops consequently, from 15.6% in Model 2 at t=25 to 9.9%. The share of the 90 to 99th percentiles also decreases (from 40.6% to 36.2%). The main beneficiaries of the introduction of differentiated rates of returns on capital are the top 1% (whose share increases from 43.8% to 53.9%) and the top 0.1% (whose share increases from 22.4% to 28.5%).
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The fitted Lorenz curve still looks quite close to the obtained distribution, with parameters a=-0.47 and b=0.27). The fit looks even better for the very top income, at the expense of a larger under-estimation (respectively, over-estimation) of the bottom (resp., middle) income levels -see Figure 5 . The overall fit decreases, compared to Model 2, with an R square decreasing from 0.95 to 0.9. The income distribution with Model 3 is not Lorenz dominated by those generated by Model 1 nor 2, but the Gini coefficient increases from 0.441 to 0.468. we observe a further increase in the Gini coefficient.
Model 4: Intergenerational mobility
A. Analytical model and calibration
We now introduce death and inheritance. When an adult dies, we assume that his capital passes (untaxed) to his only child. However, the child will not in general have the skill/income capacity of the father. We use the 100 × 100 intergenerational income mobility matrix of Chetty et al (2014) to model this process.
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An element p ij of this matrix is the fraction of sons of fathers at the i th centile of the income distribution who have incomes at the j th centile of their cohort's income distribution. Indeed, we assume that the matrix P = {p ij } defines the mobility of skill, hence earned income.
To describe the dynamics, let us first suppose that all fathers die at once at the beginning of the year. If an s father dies at the beginning of year t, his son inherits S t−1 (s) . 
, which is the correct number of sons of s fathers who end up at Q j . If we add up these numbers over all j, we have:
which is the total number of sons whose fathers were of skill s. Now let's look at all fathers s ∈Q i . The number of sons who end up at some ′ s ∈Q j will be 100
which is correct number of sons at ′ s . Now let's compute the total savings inherited by children when their fathers' estates pass to them. We are interested in the total savings at a generic skill level ′ s in the son's generation. These savings come from fathers' wealth at date t − 1 --so these are the savings at the beginning of date t for the sons, before they have augmented their savings with their own income (which will be with wages at skill level ′ s ). The amount of inheritance at each value of father's s will be the same. The average inheritance for sons at ′ s in centile j will be:
We now integrate this over all sons:
which is the total inheritance of all sons -that is, total wealth. Thus, in the sons' generation, there is, initially, heterogeneity of wealth at any skill level ′ s .
We now drop the assumption that all fathers die at the beginning of the year, and suppose, instead, that a fraction q of all fathers die at each skill level at the beginning of each
year. Thus the capital at end of date t at skill level s will be an average of the capital of those who did not die and of the newly inheriting sons who arrive at skill level s. The average capital at skill level s at the end of the year is:
The quantity in the first part of this convex combination is the average wealth of those who do not die at the beginning of date t --call it 'survivors' capital'--and S t−1 * (s) is the average wealth of sons who join type s at the beginning of date t.
However, we do not attempt to keep track of the heterogeneity of wealth at each skill level that occurs as a result of death and inheritance. We only track average wealth at each skill level. Thus, we aggregate at each skill level s at each date, and assign everyone of that skill level the average amount of capital from (5.6). If you are the son of a wealthy father, your inheritance will add wealth to the cohort at your skill level, but it will not benefit you especially.
The equations summarizing the model are the same 13 equations given at the end of subsection 4.A., except that we substitute equation (5.6) for (2.6) for the intergenerational transmission of wealth. We add the following equation to this set:
14. Wealth of an inheriting son, at the beginning of date t, whose own skill level is ′ s :
As for solving the model, we proceed as previously up to and including the solving of consumption and investment. S t−1 * (⋅) is then determined by (5.7), and finally, S t (⋅) is determined by (5.6).
B. Numerical results
We have performed two sets of computations, one where 2% of the population dies and is replaced at the end of each period (q=0.02) and one where 4% get replaced (q=0.04). The results we obtain are all monotone in q, so we only report those with q=0.04.
Insert Social mobility is then detrimental to capital accumulation and to GDP, and results in less lobbying by wealthy agents. Its impact on the distribution of wealth is sizeable. First of all, the bottom half of the distribution starts accumulating a little bit of wealth (1.15% of total capital) for the first time in our simulations. Second, the patrimonial middle-class (with a wealth share increasing from 9.9% to 22.2%) and the 90th to 99th percentiles (with a share increasing from 36.2% to 40.3%) also benefit from social mobility. Finally, the losers are the top wealth owners, whose share decreases in a sizeable way (from 53.9% to 36.5% for the top 1%, and from 28.5% to 17% for the top 0.1%).
Social mobility has then a detrimental impact on production (a large decrease in GDP, and an even larger decrease in capital accumulation), but improves wealth inequality. The share of wealth owned by the top 1% and the top .1% decrease significantly, to the benefit of all others. The bottom half of the distribution accumulates some (modest) wealth, for the first time in our simulations, but the main winner is the patrimonial middle class, whose wealth share more than doubles. We obtain the exact same qualitative effects with the hybrid (lognormal-Pareto) skill distribution described in the Appendix.
To conclude, we provide a comparison of some results obtained with the four models, first in Table 6 and then in Figures 6 to 8 .
Insert Table 6 around here Table 6 reports the consumption levels of individuals at the median and the 99. The pattern is opposite at the 99.5th percentile, with consumption increasing with lobbying and with differentiated rates of return, but decreasing with mobility. A similar pattern holds for lobbying expenses and for the Gini coefficients, which are maximal in Model 3. We then obtain a very clear picture, with lobbying and differentiated rates of return on capital benefiting the very rich, at the expense of the median, while mobility works in the opposite direction.
The value of the demogrant decreases with the introduction of lobbying and of differentiated rates of return on capital, but also with the introduction of mobility. The latter effect may be counter-intuitive, because of the larger capital income tax rate in Model 4, and is due to the large decrease in capital accumulation (the share of total income devoted to the demogrant actually increases when we introduce social mobility). Social mobility then generates a trade-off between the consumption levels of the poorest (whose main source of income is the demogrant) and of the median agent. Figures 6 and 7 show that there is little difference between the first two models in terms of absolute individual wealth and thus also of wealth distribution. Figure 6 shows that the top 10% of the skill distribution accumulates more capital in absolute value in Model 2 (where lobbying is introduced), which results in a shift, in the capital distribution, from the patrimonial middle class to the top 10%. Figure 6 also shows that the introduction of differentiated returns to capital induces the top 1.5% to accumulate more capital in absolute value, while the others accumulate less. This move is confirmed by looking at Figure 7 . Moreover, Figure 7 shows that the impact of moving to Model 3 on the wealth distribution is sizeable. Finally, allowing for social mobility reduces very significantly the capital accumulation (in absolute value) of the top 10% of the skill distribution. In terms of distribution, this benefits not only the bottom half of the distribution, but also the patrimonial middle class.
10 Figure 8 shows the fitted Lorenz curves of the income distributions generated by the four models. The only Lorenz domination relationship is between Models 1 and 2, as stated above.
10
The discontinuities associated with Model 4 on Figures 6 and 7 are due to the fact that we use a 100 by 100 mobility matrix (with each row/column representing a centile of the income distribution) rather than a smooth function.
Conclusions
In all models studied, the growth rates of income and of average wealth are significantly smaller than the interest rate (g<r using Piketty's terminology). This goes in hand with a capital deepening of the economy with time, an increase in the capital/output ratio and a roughly stable share of capital in total income. In the first model studied, we observe a more unequal distribution of wealth as time passes, with the proportion of agents with no wealth increasing, and more generally, the 90th to 99th All these results continue to hold when we model a hybrid lognormal-Pareto skill distribution, rather than a purely lognormal one. The only differences are that we obtain a better fit to the Jantzen and Volpert (2012)'s Lorenz curve with the hybrid skill distribution, and that the Gini coefficients are larger than with the pure lognormal skill distribution, whatever the model considered.
[ Table 7 about here] Table 7 presents the Saez and Zucman (2014) top US wealth shares in 2012, which are virtually identical to the wealth shares in our four models at date t = 1 , and then presents the top wealth shares at date t = 25 from our four models. It seems that the most significant difference between our simulation results and Piketty's history of recent capital accumulation is that in Model 4, when intergenerational mobility is introduced, the share of the top 1% and the top 0.1% of wealth-holders falls, albeit quite slowly. We think there are several possible explanations. The first is that ours is a competitive model, except for the introduction of variable rates of return in Models 3 and 4. We do note the rapid rate of increase of the wealth share of the top 1% and 0.1% in Model 3. In reality, the last thirty years in the United States may be best characterized as a period where capital has won significant gains through changing the bargaining conditions with labor, principally through the ascendency of neoliberal ideology and the concomitant attack on labor unions. One piece of evidence is that earnings have not increased with productivity. Another is the observed increase in the share of capital income. According to Piketty (2014, Figure 6 .5), this share rose from 21% in 1975 to 28% in 2010; we do not see a comparable increase in our simulations, and this may be due to our competitive model. (In our first three models, capital's share is remarkably stable over the 25 year period, and in the fourth model it falls a little bit.) If indeed the increase of the wealth share at the very top of the distribution is due to the ascendency of neoliberalism it may have been a one-shot phenomenon, and we might expect the wealth shares of the top 1% and 0.1% to become more stable, as they are in our simulations. This view is not inconsistent with one held by Piketty, that the share of income (if not wealth) at the top in the US has been due to the setting of executive compensation in a non-competitive way. Indeed, the high salaries of top managers may simply be a transfer from workers facilitated by neoliberalism.
A second possible explanation has to do with the intergenerational transmission matrix of Chetty et al (2014) that we used. We employed this matrix to generate the intergenerational transmission of skills (which is to say labor income), while in reality it is a transmission matrix of all income of fathers to sons. There is also less persistence in wealth holding across generations in our model than there is in reality because we distribute all inherited wealth among the entire skill cohort that a son enters, rather than keeping track of dynasties. Thus, our model implements more mixing of wealth than in fact occurs. In the other direction, we have assumed less dispersion of wealth than may indeed occur, if wealthy families have more than one child who inherits. It seems that a more nuanced approach to intergenerational mobility than ours is required.
Appendix: Introducing a Pareto tail in the skill distribution
We assume that the skill distribution is lognormal (with cdf F and density f) up to skill x*, and then follows a Pareto distribution for x > x * . The CDF of the Pareto distribution is Jones (2015) reports that η = 0.6 in the U.S. We then have two parameters to estimate: the threshold x* and a.
In order to obtain a cut-off skill x* that is not too large, we have to truncate the domain of the distribution function to [0,B], where we choose (arbitrary) that B = 6. (Recall that our lognormal distribution has a mean of one and a median of 0.85.)
We want the two density functions (lognormal and Pareto) to take the same value at x*, so that the overall density function is continuous over the whole range. Let b equal the integral of the distribution function that we construct on [0,B] before normalizing it to be 1. The normalized density on the first part is ( ) / f x b . We then solve We then solve the equation:
for b, using the formula for a. We obtain that b=1. 0082 , a=0.193 and x*=3.2, with F(x * ) / b = 0.982. In words, the distribution of skills is lognormal for the bottom 98.2% of the skill distribution, and Pareto for the top 1.8%. Results obtained with the hybrid Lognormal-Pareto skill distribution for the four models are so similar to those obtained with the lognormal distribution that we do not report them here. They are available upon request from the authors.
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